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A provocative speaker, Dr. John V. Petrocelli offers practical and actionable strategies that actually enhance meeting professional and organizational goals. By emphasizing social science and the things that successful organizations do effectively, he shows organizations a clear path to accomplishing their goals. About John As an Experimental Social Psychologist Dr. John V. Petrocelli has the goal of helping organizational leaders better position themselves and their organizations to reach their fullest potential. With strategies rooted in scientific research, that’s exactly what he does, empowering organizational leaders with proven tools for improving communication, strengthening influence, and establishing a foundation of evidence-based management. A provocative and convincing speaker, Dr. Petrocelli offers practical and immediately actionable strategies that actually enhance the chances of successfully meeting professional and organizational goals. By emphasizing social science and the things that successful organizations do consistently and effectively, he shows organizations and their employees a clear path to accomplishing their goals. Dr. Petrocelli offers keynotes and seminars on a variety of leadership, communication, and evidence-based management topics that are critical to high-performance in business management, market intelligence, technology, behavioral design, finance, education, and health care. Curriculum Vitae John is represented by Macmillan Speakers Bureau . For more information, contact Scottie Bowditch: scottie.bowditch@macmillan.com Phone: 1-646-307-5567 Connect with John

Connect with John

Publications Disclaimer: Articles provided on this website as pdfs were published by journals and in edited volumes and thus copyrighted to them. These links are intended to facilitate the accepted practice that authors distribute copies of their articles to interested parties for personal use only. No commercial use may be made of the articles nor is mass-production of the articles permitted. Should you download them, you may be violating copyright laws. Books Petrocelli, J. V. (2021). The life-changing science of detecting bullshit . St. Martin’s Press. Publications Petrocelli, J. V., Rice, E. N., & Curran, J. M. (in press). When fools have greater influence than liars: Testing the insidious bullshit hypothesis with the illusory truth effect. Current Psychology . Petrocelli, J. V. (in press). TED Talks: Are they “ideas worth spreading”? Skeptical Inquirer . Petrocelli, J. V. (2025). Return of the blue books: Grading in the time of artificial intelligence. Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning , 57 (4) , 25-28. A Petrocelli, J. V., Li, Y., Wang, E., & Curran, J. M. (2024). Bullshitting and bullibility: Conditions and consequences. Social Psychology , 55 , 262-279. A Petrocelli, J. V., Curran, J. M., & Stall, L. M. (2024). Bullshit can be harmful to your health: Bullibility as a precursor to poor decision making. Current Opinion in Psychology , 55 (1), Article 101769 . A Albarracín, D., Conway, P., Laurent, S., Laurin, K., Manzi, F., Petrocelli, J. V., Rattan, A., Salvador, C. E., Stern, C., Todd, A., Touré-Tillery, M., Wakslak, C., & Zou, X. (2024). Inaugural editorial. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 126 , 1-4. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2023). Persuasive bullshitters a nd the insidious bullshit hypothesis. Skeptical Inquirer , 47 (5), 26-30. A Petrocelli, J. V., Silverman, H. E., & Shang, S. X. (2023 ). Social perception and influence of lies vs. bullshit: A test of the insidious bullshit hypot hesis. Current Psychology , 4 2 , 9609-9617. A Petrocelli, J. V., Seta, C. E., & Seta, J. J. (2023). Lies and bullshit: The negative effects of misinformation grow stronger over time. Applied Cognitive Psychology , 37 , 409-418. A Stall, L. M., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2023). Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence. Applied Cognitive Psychology , 37 , 266-276. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2022). Politically oriented bullshit detection: Attitudinally conditional bullshit receptivity and bullshit sensitivity. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations , 25 , 1635-1652. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2021). Bullshitting and persuasion: The persuasiveness of a disregard for the truth. British Journal of Social Psychology , 60 , 1464-1483. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2021). Expert bullshit detection. Skeptic , 26 (3), 47-53. A Vohs, K. D., Schmeichel, B. J., Lohmann, S., Gronau, Q. F., Finley, A., ... Petrocelli, J. V., ... & Albarracín, D. (2021). A multi-site preregistered, paradigmatic test of the ego depletion effect. Psychological Science , 32 , 1566-1581. A Petrocelli, J. V., Watson, H. F., & Hirt, E. R. (2020). Self-regulatory aspects of bullshitting and bullshit detection. Social Psychology , 51 , 239-253. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2020). Bullshit and its detection: The conditions under which common, everyday bullshit is most likely to emerge. Skeptic , 25 (2), 50-55. A Street, R. L., Petrocelli, J. V., Amroze, A., Bergelt, C., Murphy, M., Wieting, J. M., & Mazor, K. M. (2020). How communication “failed” or “saved the day”: Counterfactual accounts of medical errors. Journal of Patient Experience , 7 , 1247-1254. A Taha, A. E., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2020). Advertising opinions. Tulsa Law Review , 56 , 77-108. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2018). Antecedents of bullshitting. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 76 , 249-258. A Petrocelli, J. V., & Whitmire, M. B. (2017). Emotion decoding and incidental processing fluency as antecedents of attitude certainty. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 43 , 924- 939. A Petrocelli, J. V., Rubin, A. L., & Stevens, R. L. (2016). The sin of prediction: When mentally simulated alternatives compete with reality. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 42 , 1635-1652. A Petrocelli, J. V., Williams, S. A., & Clarkson, J. J. (2015). The bigger they come, the harder they fall: The paradoxical effect of regulatory depletion on attitude change. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 58 , 82-94. A Petrocelli, J. V., Kammrath, L. K., Brinton, J. E., Uy, M. R., Cowens, D. F. L. (2015). Holding on to what might have been may loosen (or tighten) the ties that bind us: A counterfactual potency analysis of previous dating alternatives. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 56 , 50-59. A Seta, C. E., Seta, J. J., Petrocelli, J. V., & McCormick, M. (2015). Even better than the real thing: Alternative outcome bias affects decision judgments and decision regret. Thinking and Reasoning , 21 , 446-472. A Taha, A. E., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2015). Disclosures about disclosures: Can conflict of interest warnings be made more effective? Journal of Empirical Legal Studies , 12 , 236-251. A Dowd, K. W., Petrocelli, J. V., & Wood, M. T. (2014). Integrating information from multiple sources: A metacognitive account of self-generated and externally-provided anchors. Thinking and Reasoning , 20 , 315-332. A Taha, A. E., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2014). Sending mixed messages: Investor interpretations of disclosures of analyst stock ownership. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law , 20 , 68-77. A Petrocelli, J. V., Clarkson, J. J., Whitmire, M. B., & Moon, P. E. (2013). When ab ≠ c – c’: Published errors in the reports of single mediator models. Behavior Research Methods , 45 , 595- 601. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2013). Pitfalls of counterfactual thinking in medical practice: Preventing errors by using more functional reference points. Journal of Public Health Research , 2 , 136-143. A Petrocelli, J. V., Seta, C. E., & Seta, J. J. (2013). Dysfunctional counterfactual thinking: When simulating alternatives to reality impedes experiential learning. Thinking and Reasoning , 19 , 205-230. A Petrocelli, J. V., Seta, C. E., & Seta, J. J. (2012). Prefactual potency: The perceived likelihood of alternatives to anticipated realities. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 38 , 1467- 1479. A Petrocelli, J. V., Seta, C. E., Seta, J. J., & Prince, L. B. (2012). "If only I could stop generating counterfactual thoughts": When counterfactual thinking interferes with academic performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 48 , 1117-1123. A Petrocelli, J. V., & Harris, A. K. (2011). Learning inhibition in the Monty Hall Problem: The role of dysfunctional counterfactual prescriptions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 37 , 1297-1311. A Petrocelli, J. V., Percy, E. J., Sherman, S. J., & Tormala, Z. L. (2011). Counterfactual potency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition , 100 , 30-46. A Petrocelli, J. V., Clarkson, J. J., Tormala, Z. L., & Hendrix, K. S. (2010). Perceiving stability as a means to attitude certainty: The role of implicit theories of attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 46 , 874-883. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2010). Validity of research conclusions. In N. J. Salkind (Ed.), Encyclopedia of research design (Vol. 3, pp. 1596-1599). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. A Petrocelli, J. V., Martin, J. L., & Li, W. Y. (2010). Shaping behavior through malleable self-perceptions: A test of the forced-agreement scale effect (FASE). Journal of Research in Personality , 44 , 213-221. A Petrocelli, J. V., & Sherman, S. J. (2010). Event detail and confidence in gambling: The role of counterfactual thought reactions. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 46 , 61-72. A Petrocelli, J. V., & Crysel, L. C. (2009). Counterfactual thinking and confidence in blackjack: A test of the counterfactual inflation hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 45 , 1312-1315. A Petrocelli, J. V., & Dowd, K. (2009). Ease of counterfactual thought generation moderates the relationship between need for cognition and punitive responses to crime. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 35 , 1179-1192. A Sherman, J. W., Kruschke, J. K., Sherman, S. J., Percy, E. J., Petrocelli, J. V., & Conrey, F. R. (2009). Attentional processes in stereotype formation: A common model for category accentuation and illusory correlation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition , 96 , 305-323. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2008). [Review of the book Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (2nd ed.)]. Journal of Social Psychology , 148 , 775-777. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2007). The utility of a computer-assisted power analysis lab instruction. Teaching of Psychology , 34 , 248-252. A Kay, A. C., Jost, J. T., Mandisodza, A. N., Sherman, S. J., Petrocelli, J. V., & Johnson, A. L. (2007). Panglossian ideology in the service of system justification: How complementary stereotypes help us to rationalize inequality. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 39, pp. 305-358). Academic Press. A Petrocelli, J. V., Tormala, Z. L., & Rucker, D. D. (2007). Unpacking attitude certainty: Attitude clarity and attitude correctness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition , 92 , 30-41. A Johnson, A. L., Crawford, M. T., Sherman, S. J., Rutchick, A. M., Hamilton, D. L., Ferreira, M., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2006). A functional perspective on group memberships: Differential need fulfillment in a group typology. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 42 , 707-719. A Petrocelli, J. V., & Smith, E. R. (2005). Who I am, who we are, and why: Links between emotions and causal attributions for self and group-discrepancies. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 31 , 1628-1642. A Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., Petrocelli, J. V., Bates, J. M., & Owens-Hennick, L. A. (2005). Depression and somatic complaints among male juvenile offenders: Differentiating somatizers from non-somatizers with the Millon Adolescent Clinical Inventory (MACI). Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology , 16 , 566-576. Cohen, P. J., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., Bradshaw, C. P., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2005). Examining readiness for change: A preliminary evaluation of the University of Rhode Island Change Assessment (URICA) with a male incarcerated adolescent sample. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development , 38 , 45-62. Strano, D. A., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2005). A preliminary examination of the role of inferiority feelings in the academic achievement of college students. Journal of Individual Psychology , 61 , 80-89. Trusty, J., Thompson, B., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2004). Practical guide for reporting effect size in the Journal of Counseling & Development. Journal of Counseling and Development , 82 , 107-110. Scarborough, Z., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., Stefurak, J., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2004). Clusterderived groupings of the Behavior Assessment System for Children among male juvenile offenders. Journal of Offender Rehabilitation , 39 , 1-17. Petrocelli, J. V. (2003). Hierarchical multiple regression in counseling research: Common problems and possible remedies. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development , 36 , 9-22. A Petrocelli, J. V., Calhoun, G. B., & Glaser, B. A. (2003). The role of general family functioning in the quality of the mother-daughter relationship of female African American juvenile offenders. Journal of Black Psychology , 29 , 378-392. Petrocelli, J. V. (2003). Factor validation of the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale: Evidence for a short version. Journal of Social Psychology , 143 , 405-413. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2002). Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Where’s the ambivalence? American Psychologist , 57 , 443-444. A Petrocelli, J. V. (2002). More on the consequences of savage reviews. APS Observer , 15 (2), 7. Petrocelli, J. V. (2002). Effectiveness of group cognitive-behavioral therapy for general symptomatology: A meta-analysis. Journal for Specialists in Group Work , 27 , 92-115. Petrocelli, J. V. (2002). Processes and stages of change: Counseling with the transtheoretical model of change. Journal of Counseling and Development , 80 , 22-30. A Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2002). Personality characteristics of male juvenile offenders by adjudicated offenses as indicated by the MMPI-A. Criminal Justice and Behavior , 29 , 183-201. Glaser, B. A., Campbell, L. F., Calhoun, G. B., Bates, J. M., & Petrocelli, J. V. (2002). The Early Maladaptive Schema Questionnaire–Short Form: A construct validity study. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development , 35 , 2-13. Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F. (2001). Personality and affect characteristics of outpatients with depression. Journal of Personality Assessment , 77 , 162-175. Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F. (2001). Cognitive schemas as mediating variables of the relationship between the self-defeating personality and depression. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment , 23 , 183-191. Petrocelli, J. V., Glaser, B. A., Calhoun, G. B., & Campbell, L. F. (2001). Early maladaptive schemas of personality disorder subtypes. Journal of Personality Disorders, 15, 546-559. Petrocelli, J. V. (2000). [Review of the book Scientist-practitioner perspectives on test interpretation]. Psychotherapy: Theory/Research/Practice/Training , 37 , 106. Connect with John

Persuasive Bullsh*tters FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2023 | COMMENT Short of lying, bullshitting involves communicating something with little to no regard for the truth, established knowledge, or genuine evidence. Although most people believe bullshit is relatively harmless, part of what makes bullshit compelling and appealing is that it often sounds beneficial, confirming, and credible. Four experiments in persuasion suggest that bullshit can have more influence than both lies and, in some cases, evidence-based frames of the very same information. Claptrap, baloney, buffoonery, codswallop, empty-talk, garbage, hogwash, nonsense, poppycock, flapdoodle, flim-flam, flummery—and often better referenced as bullshit—our world appears to be full of it. Yet, what exactly is bullshit? Bullshit is what emerges when people communicate with little to no regard for truth, established knowledge or genuine evidence (Frankfurt, 1986; Petrocelli, 2018, 2021a). Bullshitting behavior involves a broad array of rhetorical strategies that help us sound like we know what we’re talking about in order to impress others, persuade others, influence others, or explain things in an area in which our obligations to provide our opinions exceed our knowledge in that area (Cheyne & Pennycook, 2016; Littrell et al., 2020; Petrocelli, 2018, 2021a). Bullshit is often abstract, lacking in sources and logic, or riddled with acronyms and business-speak jargon. Part of what makes bullshit compelling and appealing is that it often sounds beneficial, confirming and credible—and may thereby be persuasive. Much of the empirical research on bullshitting has dealt with the when question—that is, understanding when people are likely to bullshit us. Here, I offer a closer focus on the evidence that addresses part of the why question, that is, understanding the potential functions of bullshit. If bullshit is an undesirable communicative substance, why do people engage in the behavior so very often? Better understandings of when and why people bullshit us should place us in a much better position to detect and dispose of this unwanted social substance. Bullshitting Isn’t Lying Bullshit is not the same as lying (Frankfurt, 1986). Although the liar and bullshitter are both deceptive in that they both appear concerned with the truth, only the liar is actually concerned with truth, and the bullshitter is not. When someone lies to us, their objective is to get us to believe something they don’t believe is true. If your colleague were to say something—and he knows perfectly well it just isn’t so—then he is lying. Whereas the liar doesn’t believe what she says is true, the bullshitter has no idea as to whether or not it’s true, and frankly, doesn’t care. In fact, sometimes—just by chance or accident—the bullshitter says something that is true, but even she wouldn’t know it, because she’s not concerned about the truth, established knowledge, or evidence that may otherwise support her claims. An important difference between lying and bullshitting involves the social reactions to these two forms of communication. When people lie to us, we’re very unhappy with them and they often pay great consequences for their lies. People tend to react to the lies with strong disdain and contempt, and there may be severe consequences for being caught in a lie (e.g., “She’s a damn liar. That woman should be fired!”). In the case of bullshitting, the social consequences are much less severe (Petrocelli, Silverman, & Shang, 2023). The bullshitter may communicate the very same message as the liar. Yet, because she doesn’t really know what she’s talking about, nor does she really care what the evidence suggests, we typically pass-off her bullshit as a mild social offense (e.g., “Oh, he’s just bullshitting again.”). We assume his bullshit is harmless—but, this is where we can’t be more wrong. Insidious Bullshit Hypothesis Although bullshitting is often evaluated less negatively than lying (Petrocelli, Silverman, & Shang, 2023), Frankfurt (1986) proposed that bullshit is more damaging to society than the lie. Not only by definition is there likely to be more bullshit than lies in the world, Frankfurt believed that pursuit of truth is of paramount importance—and although the liar’s concern for truth is a corrupt one, it is less bad than the bullshitter’s total disregard for truth. Through my research in my Bullshit Studies Lab (at Wake Forest University), we’ve considered some additional possibilities that test this hypothesis. First, there are reasons to believe that bullshit may be more influential and persuasive than both evidence-based communications and lies. Second, there are also reasons to suspect that bullshit may interfere with memory more than lies, and thereby, have a greater impact on what people believe to be true. Persuasiveness of Bullshit In our first experiment, we were interested in determining whether or not bullshit has a noteworthy influence on attitudes and beliefs when examined in light of a traditional persuasion procedure (Petrocelli, 2021b). Over 500 college students were led to believe there was a new policy being proposed, by university administrators, which would require seniors to pass a comprehensive exam in their major area in order to graduate. Students were led to believe we were interested in surveying their thoughts and opinions about the proposed policy. Half of the students read persuasive arguments in favor of the exam policy that were either strong (e.g., Students who graduate from schools with comprehensive exams earn more in their starting salaries.) or weak (e.g., Duke University is doing it.). Half of the students were also assigned to either a bullshit frames condition that prefaced the arguments with comments suggesting little to no interest in available and genuine evidence (e.g., “I believe there is some research on this issue, but I’m not really concerned with the evidence.”) or an evidence-based frames condition that prefaced the arguments with comments suggesting considerable interest in the relevant evidence (e.g., I’m really concerned with the evidence concerning this issue.”). Our analysis showed clear evidence of the traditional Argument Quality effect, but only within the evidence-based frame condition—it suggests a cuing of central route processing (whereby persuasion can occur only when the arguments themselves are compelling). However, the lack of a traditional Argument Quality effect within the bullshit frame condition suggests that bullshitting may cue what is usually referred to as peripheral route processing (whereby persuasion can occur when peripheral cues like the number of arguments or attributes of the communicator appear compelling; see Figure 1). Figure 1 Attitude and Thought Favorability means by Argument Quality and Argument Frame (Experiment 1); error bars represent +/-1 standard error. From another angle, relative to evidenced-based frames, bullshit frames appeared to weaken the potency of strong arguments, yet strengthen the potency of weak arguments. Such findings are quite remarkable given the arguments themselves are the very same—they only differ in what they signal about the intentions of the communicator as they pertain to their concern for truth and evidence. Theoretically, there are two general routes to persuasion of which the route depends on the ability, opportunity, and mental resources one has at the times, as well as their general motivation to think about the content of the message. When people follow the central route to persuasion, because they have the ability, opportunity and motivation to think about a persuasive communication, they tend to listen carefully and think about the quality of the arguments presented. When people follow the peripheral route to persuasion, because they are either not motivated, or lack the capacity, to think about the arguments in a persuasive communication, they may be swayed by more superficial cues (e.g., source credibility, source attractiveness, nonverbal cues, number of arguments in the message—not their quality). We conducted another experiment, this time the attitude object was student feelings about an extended 2-week Spring Break—an idea most students like (Petrocelli, 2021b). We tried to persuade them this wasn’t a very good idea (lower attitude scores in this experiment indicated more persuasion) with persuasive arguments allegedly provided by attractive or unattractive sources (using pictures from the Chicago Face Database). Because evidence-based frames appear to prompt central route processing in our first experiment, we expected Argument Quality to matter only when participants were presented with evidence-based frames of the arguments. But, because Source Attractiveness typically operates as a peripheral route cue, we expected Source Attractiveness to matter only when participants were presented with bullshit frames of the arguments. As expected, Argument Quality made a difference but only when arguments were provided in the evidence-based frames; it didn’t matter when the arguments were provided in bullshit frames. What did matter in bullshit frames was the peripheral cue of attractiveness; attractive sources were more influential than unattractive sources when arguments were provided in bullshit frames, but the difference in attractiveness didn’t appear to matter when arguments were provided in evidence-based frames.   Figure 2 Thought Favorability means by Argument Frame and Argument Quality, and by Argument Frame and Source Attractiveness; error bars represent +/-1 standard error. Lower scores indicate more persuasion that a longer spring break is a bad idea (Petrocelli, 2021b). Bullshit Sleeper Effect We explored two additional ways in which bullshit might affect attitudes and beliefs about what is true. In our third experiment, we borrowed from a traditional sleeper effect procedure. A sleeper effect is a persuasive influence that increases, rather than decays, over time; Albarracín, et al., 2017; Cook & Flay, 1978; Priester et al., 1999). The easiest way to demonstrate a sleeper effect is by providing people positive information about a novel attitude object (e.g., political candidate) and showing that they express relatively positive attitudes (at least initially). Later, people are provided with contrary, negative information about the source of earlier information. In response, social perceivers tend to discount the initial information and adjust their attitudes downward (i.e., less positive). However, with nothing more than the passage of time, there tends to be an increase in persuasion, such that attitudes return to a more positive valence. The sleeper effect is usually explained as a differential decay in memory—people forget the discounting cue sooner than they forget the initial persuasive message, such that the initial message retains a more persistent hold on attitudes (Pratkanis et al., 1988). In our experiment, we presented over 200 participants with an advertisement promoting multiple, desirable aspects of a fictious pizza (Petrocelli, Seta, & Seta, 2023). Attitudes about the pizza were measured, and sure enough, they were overwhelmingly positive. Later on, participants were randomly assigned to one of three discounting cue conditions—one third were informed that a consumer protection agency revealed that some of the information in the advertisement contained lies, one third were informed that the advertisement contained bullshit, and one third received no discounting cue at all. Attitudes about the pizza were measured once again, and as expected, the attitudes of participants who received lies or bullshit were significantly reduced (see Figure 3). When our participants returned to our lab 10-14 days later, they were reminded of the attitude object that we asked them to read about. Then, we measured their attitude towards Ciao’s Pizza one last time. Figure 3 Attitude means for Attitude Assessment by Discounting Cue Condition (Petrocelli, Seta, & Seta, 2023). After the delay in time, attitudes in both the lie and bullshit conditions increased. However, what we found most interesting was consistent with what we’d expect from the insidious bullshit hypothesis. Not only did the bullshit discounting cue result in more positive attitudes over time compared to the lie discounting cue, but it returned attitudes to a level of positivity that we would expect if our participants had never been given a discounting cue at all—and, in a way that the lie discounting cue did not. Because bullshitting appears to produce a stronger sleeper effect for unwarranted attitudes than does lying, and attitudes are relevant to thinking and behaving, it serves as further support for the insidious bullshit hypothesis. Bullshit Illusory Truth Effect Our final experiment borrowed from a procedure used to demonstrate an illusory truth effect—the phenomenon that repeated statements are easier to process and remember (i.e., processing fluency) compared to new statements, regardless of whether repeated statements were truthful (Hasher et al., 1977). When something becomes perceptually fluent it is more easily mentally processed. If we’ve seen something before, it’s easier to recognize, it’s easier to mentally process, and we often take the relative ease to signal truth. It is relatively easy to produce an illusory truth effect (sometimes referred to as a repetition-induced memory) by first exposing people with everyday stimuli (e.g., names, statements) repeatedly. If an individual reads or hears the statement “Our sun is a red giant star.” many times over, they are more likely to believe that statement then the truthful statement “Our sun is a yellow dwarf star.”. The initial exposure sets contrast with new information not previously processed. In other words, previously processed information is relatively more perceptually fluent than new information. This “difference” in perceptual fluency is confused for truth. The illusory truth effect can be pushed even further, as empirical research has shown that even if individuals should know better, they still fell victim to the phenomenon (Fazio et al., 2015). In our final experiment, we used stimuli such as “Steinbeck is the last name of the author of The Agony and the Ecstasy.” (false; it’s Stone). We first just asked over 300 participants to rate how interesting they found each statement for the purpose of exposing them to some information that would be repeated again later. Later we asked participants how true they believed similar statements to be. Some of the statements were repeated, some were new, and some of the statements were false, and some were true. Our participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they learned 1) the author of the statements was instructed to construct statements whereby they knew half to be true and half to be false (liar), 2) the author was instructed to include statements whereby they knew half to be true and half without any real concern for truth, genuine evidence, or existing knowledge (they didn’t know, nor care, if they were true; bullshitter), or 3) the author was simply instructed to compile a list of statements but that half of the statements are true and half are false (control). When our participants were informed about some of the information being false after the initial exposure, we observed a drop in truth ratings for the control and liar conditions that was not observed for the bullshitter condition (see Figure 4). Once again, these results are consistent with the insidious bullshit hypothesis—not only were all of the items false, but bullshit exposure did not afford the same corrective attempt observed by the liar and control conditions. The very same pattern was observed for the items that happened to actually be true. There was an overall increase in truth rating for true information—and that was good—but the differences between those exposed to bullshit, versus honesty and lies, remained.   Figure 4 Mean truth ratings for by Author Condition (Petrocelli, Rice, & Shang, 2020). D espite the unfortunate actions and consequences of seemingly so many victims of bullshit (e.g., Edgar Welch, Washington, D.C., Comet Ping Pong pizzeria gunman), people often think that bullshit is harmless. Yet, data from our Bullshit Studies Lab demonstrates through four controlled experiments that bullshit can be more influential than lies, and under some conditions, evidence-based information. These results provide support for Frankfurt’s original insidious bullshit hypothesis, as well as a preliminary answer to the why question (i.e., why people engage in so much bullshitting behavior)—although bullshit may serve as a detriment of those who receive, it can work in favor of the individual bullshitter. A just-desert would appear to be—if it be true—that bullshit may get one to the top, but it never lets one stay there (Sadhguru, 2016). Downstream, negative consequences for bullshitters is a topic that awaits empirical attention. Until then, it appears that a little concern with the truth, access to readily available evidence, and perhaps treating bullshit as false as we do lies—until otherwise supported by evidence—will make all the difference. References Albarracín, D., Kumkale, G.T., & Vento, P.P.-D. (2017). How people can become persuaded by weak messages presented by credible communicators: Not all sleeper effects are created equal. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 68 , 171-180. Cheyne, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2016). The seductions of pretentious bullshit: An empirical study. Skeptic , 21 (1), 40-45. Cook, T.D., & Flay, B.R. (1978). The temporal persistence of experimentally induced attitude change: An evaluative review. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 11). New York: Academic Press. Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., & Marsh, E. J. (2015). Knowledge does not protect against illusory truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 144 , 993-1002. Frankfurt, H. G. (1986). On bullshit. Raritan Quarterly Review , 6 , 81-100. Hasher, L., Goldstein, D., & Toppino, T. (1977). Frequency and the conference of referential validity. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior , 16 , 107-112. Littrell, S., Risko, E. F., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2021). The Bullshitting Frequency Scale: Development and psychometric properties. British Journal of Social Psychology , 60 , 248-270. Petrocelli, J. V. (2018). Antecedents of bullshitting. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 76 , 249-258. Petrocelli, J. V. (2021a). The life-changing science of detecting bullshit . St. Martin’s Press. Petrocelli, J. V. (2021b). Bullshitting and persuasion: The persuasiveness of a disregard for the truth. British Journal of Social Psychology , 60 , 1464-1483. Petrocelli, J. V., Rice, E. N., & Shang, S. X. (2020). Testing the insidious bullshit hypothesis with the illusory truth effect . Poster session presented at the 21st annual convention of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, LA. Petrocelli, J. V., Seta, C. E., & Seta, J. J. (2023). Lies and bullshit: The negative effects of misinformation grow stronger over time. Applied Cognitive Psychology , 37 , 409-418. Petrocelli, J. V., Silverman, H. E., & Shang, S. X. (2023). Social perception and influence of lies vs. bullshit: A test of the insidious bullshit hypothesis. Current Psychology , 42 , 9609-9617. Pratkanis, A.R., Greenwald, A.G., Leippe, M.R., & Baumgardner, M.H. (1988). In search of reliable persuasion effects: III. The sleeper effect is dead: Long live the sleeper effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 54 , 203-218. Priester, J., Wegener, D., Petty, R., & Fabrigar, L. (1999). Examining the psychological process underlying the sleeper effect: The elaboration likelihood model explanation. Media Psychology , 1 , 27-48. Sadhguru. (2016). Inner engineering: A yogi’s guide to joy . Harmony. Watch Leave a reply/comment: Name Email (will not be published) Website Subject Your message Send Thanks for submitting! Connect with John

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Introversion in the Workplace SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2023 | COMMENT I brought receipts this time, but let’s get something straight first: the desire to feel seen , visible, and/or heard (figuratively, symbolically, and literally) is clearly at odds with the very definition of introversion. Introverts are individuals who generally recharge their energy by spending time alone, exhibiting a tendency to contemplate before taking action, learning through observation, possessing adept listening skills, and engaging in thoughtful decision-making. Introverted individuals are inclined towards listening rather than speaking, have a proclivity for innovation and creativity but tend to be averse to self-promotion, and typically prioritize solitary work over team collaboration. For introverts, things like managing meetings can be some of the most exhausting of experiences. In contrast, extroverts are people who typically derive their energy from social interactions, often making swift decisions, excelling in communication, favoring speaking over listening, and relishing the spotlight. Because introverts tend to be more reserved, primarily due to their inclination to listen and reflect rather than speak, they may experience lower visibility in the workplace, potentially resulting in missed opportunities for recognition and advancement. Introverts frequently favor textual or digital means of communication, driven by their desire to maintain concentration on their work and daily tasks. Introverts excel when they have the freedom to work at their own rhythm and respond at their convenience. On the other hand, extroverts are better suited to settings that employ more interactive modes of communication. Introverts prefer to stand in the spotlight without having to pretend to be extroverts. Yet, because we live in a society that appears to have a strong preference for extroverted traits—which are often linked to qualities such as “sociability,” “talkativeness,” “laid-back nature,” and being a “social butterfly,”—many introverted leaders learn how to exhibit extroverted qualities in order to be successful, but that doesn’t mean introverts want to be extroverts. One of the only reasons introverts may seek greater visibility in the workplace is because they often see their extroverted counterparts being rewarded for it (i.e., visibility)—BUT this doesn’t mean introverts desire the visibility that extroverts do (Blevins et al., 2022; Herbert et al., 2023). And of course, as with a great deal of experimental social psychology that finds seemingly countless person-by-situation interactions, the desire for visibility in the workplace is greatly influenced by context. For instance, Stern et al. (1983) reported that extroverts were less satisfied than introverts with their clerical jobs in terms of the work itself, supervision, and co-workers. Relatedly, Huang et al. (2016) extroverts are more likely to hold and be satisfied in jobs rich in social interaction (also see Harari et al., 2018). Furthermore, it appears that only extroverts tend to experience a “hangover effect” in the workplace—research conducted by Son and Ok (2019) indicates that the job satisfaction of newcomers follows a U-shaped pattern, decreasing initially upon joining an organization but later rebounding. This temporal evolution of job satisfaction is also found to be influenced by the extraversion of the newcomers. The findings revealed that, on average, newcomers’ job satisfaction decreases upon entry into an organization but progressively improves over time. Notably, extroverted newcomers tend to experience a more pronounced dip in job satisfaction upon joining the organization, a phenomenon often referred to as the “hangover effect.” Also, only those who believe personality matters to being valued feel that introverts sometimes need to act more extroverted in order to succeed. But again, this does not mean that introverts desire to be seen/visible, but that they can recognize the potential rewards of being visible in the workplace. Thus, to suggest that the most fundamental thing that a leader can do is help everyone they lead feel seen is a little shortsighted of the important role of introversion (given the fact that at least one-third of the population is introverted) and ignorant of the empirical research that sheds light on the issue. My perspective here is greatly influenced by Blevins et al.’s (2022) and Herbert et al.’s (2023) fantastic, systematic literature reviews of all the latest empirical research on introversion in the workplace. Other great reads on these very same takes would of course be Susan Cain’s bestseller Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World That Can’t Stop Talking and Marti Laney’s book The Introvert Advantage: How to Thrive in an Extrovert World . References: Blevins, D. P., Stackhouse, M. R. D., & Dionne, S. D. (2022). Righting the balance: Understanding introverts (and extraverts) in the workplace. International Journal of Management Reviews , 24 , 78-98. Harari, M. B., Thompson, A. H., & Viswesvaran, C. (2018). Extraversion and job satisfaction: The role of trait bandwidth and the moderating effect of status goal attainment. Personality and Individual Differences , 123 , 14-16. Herbert, J., Ferri, L., Hernandez, B., Zamarripa, I., Hofer, K., Fazeli, M. S., Shnitsar, I., & Abdallah, K. (2023). Personality diversity in the workplace: A systematic literature review on introversion. Journal of Workplace Behavioral Health , 38 , 165-187. Huang, J. L., Bramble, R. J., Liu, M., Aqwa, J. J., Ott, H. C. J., Ryan, A. M., Lounsbury, J. W., Elizondo, F., & Wadlington, P. L. (2016). Rethinking the association between extraversion and job satisfaction: The role of interpersonal job context. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology , 89 , 683-691. Luong, V., Shields, C., Petrie, A., & Neumann, K. (2022). Does personality matter? Perceptions and experiences of introverts and extraverts as general surgeons. Teaching and Learning in Medicine , 34 , 255-265. Son, J., & Ok, C. (2019). Hangover follows extroverts: Extraversion as a moderator in the curvilinear relationship between newcomers’ organizational tenure and job satisfaction. Journal of Vocational Behavior , 110 , 72-88. Sterns, L., Alexander, R. A., Barrett, G. V., & Dambrot, F. H. (1983). The relationship of extraversion and neuroticism with job preferences and job satisfaction for clerical employees. Journal of Occupational Psychology , 56 , 145-153. You can take a look at all of these sources here: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1z3-do-hWNJXO7mH0llEqKe4UrWkQ9b32?usp=sharing #introversion #introverts #introversionintheworkplace #leadership #nobullshitleadership Watch Leave a reply/comment: Name Email (will not be published) Website Subject Your message Send Thanks for submitting! Connect with John

http://www.johnvpetrospeaks.com/ John Petrocelli Keynote Speaker Better Information, Better Decisions BOOK JOHN SIGNALS NEWSLETTER Pohl Consulting and Training, Inc Keynote Speaker TOPICS AND KEYNOTES Decentselling Author John’s books feature insights from social science and practical applications for improving your work and life. SEE BOOKS Featured Articles article , video Persuasive Bullsh*tters Short of lying, bullshitting involves communicating something with little to no regard for the truth, established knowledge, or genuine evidence. Although most people believe bullshit is relatively harmless... Read More article Artificial Intelligence Many of us will soon find ourselves embracing generative artificial intelligence (AI) in our daily lives. Those who resist will be akin to those who clung to those outdated library card catalogs... Read More article , video Evidence-Based Leadership with A/B Testing From intuition and common-sense (i.e., conventional management strategies) to maturity and sound A/B testing, better information often lends to better decisions... Read More article Business Leadership BS The wonderful thing about the marketplace of business ideas and the leadership development advice industry is that they're full of ideas. The problem with the marketplace of business ideas and the leadership development... Read More Connect with Johnvpetrocelli

About John Social Psychologist Dr. John V. Petrocelli has the goal of helping organizational leaders better position themselves and their organizations to reach their fullest potential. With strategies rooted in scientific research, that’s exactly what he does, empowering organizational leaders with proven tools for improving communication, strengthening influence, and establishing a foundation of evidence-based management. A provocative and convincing speaker, Dr. Petrocelli offers practical and immediately actionable strategies that actually enhance the chances of successfully meeting professional and organizational goals. By emphasizing social science and the things that successful organizations do consistently and effectively, he shows organizations and their employees a clear path to accomplishing their goals. Dr. Petrocelli offers keynotes and seminars on a variety of leadership, communication, and evidence-based management topics that are critical to high-performance in business management, market intelligence, technology, behavioral design, finance, education, and health care. John V. Petrocelli is represented by Les Tuerk of BrightSight Speakers , 609-924-3060 or les@brightsightgroup.com [see Dr. Petrocelli’s Speaker page at BrightSight Speakers ]. Be first in line for new content and actionable ideas by joining John’s popular email newsletter. Each week, he shares educational (and entertaining) videos, articles, and podcasts that will help you and your team to use better information to make better decisions. Over 40,000 leaders just like you have subscribed. Enter your email now and join us. Enter Your Best Email below Subscribe Thanks for subscribing! Connect with John

Teaching PSY 260 Social Psychology PSY 311 Research Methods in Psychology I PSY 355 Research in Social Psychology PSY 374 Research in Judgment and Decision Making PSY 392 Contemporary Issues in Psychology - Mental Simulation PSY 392 Contemporary Issues in Psychology - Implicit Social Cog PSY 392 Contemporary Issues in Psychology - Misinformation, BSing, and Calling BS PSY 752 Seminar in Social Psychology Connect with John

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Research As an experimental social psychologist, my research involves experimental social cognition and judgment and decision making. My specific research interests include bullshitting behavior, bullshit detection and disposal, attitude strength and persuasion, counterfactual thinking and metacognition. Bullshitting Behavior and Bullshit Detection/Disposal. Bullshitting is a pervasive social behavior involving intentionally or unintentionally communicating with little to no regard or concern for truth, genuine evidence, and/or established semantic, logical, systemic, or empirical knowledge. Bullshitting is often characterized by, but not limited to, using rhetorical strategies designed to disregard truth, evidence and/or established knowledge, such as exaggerating or embellishing one’s knowledge, competence, or skills in a particular area or talking about things of which one knows nothing about in order to impress, fit in with, influence, or persuade others. Bullshitting is different from lying in that the liar is actually concerned with the truth – the liar tries to divert us from the truth. The bullshitter doesn’t really care what the truth is, he/she isn’t even trying – the bullshitter may be correct in his/her claim but wouldn’t know it. What are the antecedents, consequences, and utilities of this seemingly pervasive and inevitable behavior? Under what social conditions and/or mental states is bullshitting attenuated or augmented? Under what conditions are people receptive and/or sensitive to bullshit? How can people better detect and dispose of bullshit? Attitude Strength and Persuasion. How do various components of attitude strength (e.g., attitude certainty, attitudinal ambivalence, and attitude accessibility) affect attitude change and resistance to persuasive attempts? How do sub-components of such attitude attributes influence the attitude-behavior link, attitude stability, persistence, and resistance to persuasive attempts? Counterfactual Thinking. Counterfactual thinking involves mentally simulating alternatives to reality and playing out the consequences of those alternatives (i.e., “could have,” “would have,” “should have,” or “if only” thinking). What role does counterfactual thinking play in reactions to general and specific cases? How does it affect memory for previous events? What role does it play in learning and performance on tasks? How does counterfactual thinking affect a physician’s diagnostic and treatment selection decisions? Metacognition. Metacognition involves thinking about one’s thoughts and thought processes. How do metacognitive components of attitude strength affect attitude change? How does a metacognitive aspect of counterfactual thinking (i.e., counterfactual potency) influence affect, judgments of social targets, and decisions? Connect with John